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Prev,enting Corporate Crises: Stock 
Marl{.et Lo,s,s-e•s as a Deterrent to the 
Pr1oduc-tion 01f Hazardous Products 
Alfred A. Marcus 
Philip Bromiley Robert Goodman The classic theory of the firm is based on the idea that managers are agents for the owners, so increasing share­holder wealth, according to this theory, is the appropri• ate norm for judging managerial behavior. Negative stock market returns, therefore, should discourage man• agers from engaging in activities that lead to corporate crises. This paper calculates the stock market reactions to two kinds of crises-automobile safety recalls and the toxic chemical release in Bhopal. In the auto safety ease, shareholder losses arc limited largely to a few days around the event (to one company, Chrysler, for two time-periods 1973-74 and 1976-77). In the Bhopal case, wltile Union Carbide stock suffers a steep decline in the period after the accident, within 90 trading days it begins to rebound largely because the company is undervalued and is an attractive takeover target. These results raise questions as to whether the stock market dependably discourages managers from engaging in actions that lead to corporate crises. ACCORDING TO Friedman (1970), Rappaport (1981, 1983), and others the appropriate objective of managers is to increase the wealth of share-Philip Bromiley is an Assistant Professor of Strategic Management at the Carlson School of Management, University of Min­nesota. His past publication topics include corporate capital investment, organizational planning and decision making. His current research examines the determinants of cor­porate risk taking and the influence of risk taking on corporate performance. holders within the bounds of law and ethics. This view, however, is not unanimously held. The debate about appropriate managerial goals and mo­tivations is an old one (Marris, ket react-ions to corporate 01·ises is part of a larger research endeavor. Robert Goodman is a Professor of Strategic Management at the University of Syracuse School of Busine,ss. He is in the process of getting his Ph.D. at the Carlson School of Management. He formerly worked in commercial banking. 1963; Cyert and March, 1963; Wil­liamson, 1964), and its resolution is not within the scope of this paper. (Seitz, 1982, Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983, and Chakravarthy, 1986 have useful perspectives on these issues.) Rather, we ask: If managers' primary goal is to increase shareholder wealth, would stock market returns discourage them from engaging in practices that might lead to corporate crises? Alfred M. Marcus is an Assistant Professor of Business, Government, and Society at the Carlson School of Management, Uni­versity of Minnesota. He is co-editor of Business Strategy and Public Policy which will be published by Greenwood Praeger in August, 1987. This study of stock mar-SPRING 1987 The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Grant Yonehiro, Mark Weber, Scott Hallstrom, Pat Hess, Gordon Alexander, Robert Vigeland, Barry Mitnick, and Fred Thompson. All findings and comments remain the responsibility of the authors. THE CORPORATE SOCIAL POLICY LITERATURE Although there have been few sys­tematic studies of corporate crises, many crises can be viewed as the 33 









